to obtain the MGF of the instantaneous SNR at the combiner output. Based on this result and applying the MGF-based method, the average SEP has then been attained in terms of the distinct eigenvalues of the Gaussian components and their associated algebraic multiplicities. The approach has been applied to some special cases, such as the dual-branch correlated and the independent multichannel case, and agreements with previously reported results have been verified. Furthermore, although the analysis focused on rectangular QAM constellations, the proposed approach can easily be extended to other M -ary modulation schemes. REFERENCES [1] 
I. INTRODUCTION
In a vehicular ad hoc network, vehicle-to-vehicle communications allow vehicles to exchange information about road or traffic conditions, thereby enabling a safer and more conducive travelling environment. Security requirements for such communications have been studied by various authors and organizations, and we refer to [4] and [6] for extensive overviews and references.
For the purpose of this paper, we first briefly review the following four concerns in this context: 1) the authenticity of a message; 2) the privacy of the drivers and vehicles; 3) the reliability of distributed information; and 4) the revocation of illegitimate vehicles.
On the question of the authenticity of a message, one solution is to ensure that a message originated from a legitimate source. In the literature of vehicle-to-vehicle communications, this property is achieved by using a cryptographic data chain, starting with a trusted third party (TTP) and ending up with a message announcement. The TTP distributes credentials to legitimate vehicles. One example of such a TTP is a certification authority (CA), and the distributed credentials are public key certificates (e.g., [4] and [6] ). These vehicles use the certified public keys to either sign an announcement or introduce further credentials as part of the data chain. It guarantees that the announced message has been created by a legitimate vehicle and that the validity of the data chain is publicly verifiable.
In general, user privacy 1 includes two aspects, namely, anonymity and unlinkability. Anonymity of drivers and vehicles can be protected by using pseudonyms that do not indicate their owners' identities. Unlinkability means that different messages sent by a vehicle should not be identified as coming from one source. This property prevents user tracking and profiling, and as shown in the literature, it can be achieved by using different pseudonyms for different announcements (e.g., [1] and [4] - [6] ). The reliability of distributed information provides assurance to a receiver that the received information on an event is a true report. Normally, vehicles communicating with each other do not have a strong trust relation. As suggested in the literature, message reliability can be achieved by some threshold method, that is, the receiver only accepts a message that has been confirmed by multiple vehicles (e.g., [2] - [4] and [7] ).
The property of revocation means that, if a source is no longer legitimate, it should not be able to send a valid message. There are various methods to achieve this property. One example is to rely on a trusted revocation authority who, for each vehicle, holds a piece of information enabling him to retrieve the vehicle owner's identity from any anonymous message. If a vehicle is no longer legitimate, the authority releases this information, and then, verifiers will reject all messages from that vehicle, as addressed for a target in [4] .
Three schemes were proposed in Kounga et al. [4] , which achieved various levels of security. The first, "basic," and the second, "scalable," solutions address the problems of certificate and key management, whereas the third, "optimized," solution aims to provide the aforementioned four security properties: authentication, privacy (anonymity and unlinkability), reliability, and revocation.
In the remainder of this paper, we will first briefly review the third solution (which we will denote as the KWL scheme) and then show that this solution fails to achieve any of its goals. We emphasize, however, that we have only applied our attacks to the KWL scheme (the third solution) and that they do not invalidate the other solutions, which were proposed to address different issues.
II. KWL SCHEME
We now give an overview of this scheme. In the scheme, a CA uses a master private key to generate multiple private keys, each of which is given to a tamper-resistant black box associated with a vehicle. A black box then uses its private key to generate multiple short-term certificates for short-term public/private key pairs. This would provide a proof of legitimacy. Unlinkability would be achieved by the constant updates of the short-term certificates-messages broadcast while using one certificate should not be linkable to messages broadcast using another. The details of the scheme are as follows.
The CA holds a secret key K and computes a check value V = h(g AK ), where h is a one-way hash function, and g is a generator of a group G of order q for some large prime q. Both A and K are large positive integers. It is assumed that the discrete logarithm problem in G = g is hard, which means that, for any polynomial-time Turing machine, solving this problem is computationally infeasible. The value V and a certificate Cert{V }, which is signed by the CA, are available to all vehicles. Each vehicle C k (with index k) is equipped with a tamperresistant black box BB k . Other global parameters include m, which is the maximum number of short-term key pairs that can be generated by a black box, and lifeTime, which is the validity period of each such key pair. Another hash function f is also available to all black boxes.
At the point of manufacture, the black box BB k is loaded with the following values: 1) V and Cert{V }; 2) s k , which is a secret value specific to BB k ;
where j is an integer, and f j (s k ) denotes an operation that takes the value s k as input and runs the function f j times, i.e., f j (s k ) = f (f j−1 (s k )); 4) Q k , which is a positive integer computed by the CA that satisfies the equation K = P k Q k + r k , where r k is also a positive integer; 5) g r k ∈ G, where r k is computed by the CA as above and is only known to the CA; 6) A; 7) global parameters, including g, h, f , m, and lifeTime; 8) other global conditions, including nbSignatures, which is the minimum number of signed messages reporting on an event that must be received for the report to be considered reliable, and maxTime, which is the maximum duration in which these messages must be received.
Note that the CA's secret key K has to be chosen so that K P k for all P k .
Note also that the CA stores the value R k = g Ar k as a piece of revocation information. When the CA decides that the vehicle C k is no longer legitimate, the CA can revoke it by publishing this information.
To generate the short-term certificate to be used in the time interval T i , BB k chooses a secret random integer a i such that
It is not clear from [4] how Aa i r k is computed, since BB k does not know r k . It could perhaps simply choose a i = lP k /A for some random l.
The private key K i for this time interval is then
and the corresponding public key is
The helper value H i and the value L i are also computed by BB k , where
Finally, BB k generates a short-term public/private key pair pub T i / priv T i and transfers them to C k along with G i , H i , L i , and Cert i , which is a certificate for pub T i signed using BB k 's private key K i . To broadcast a message msg, C k signs it with private key priv T i to get a signature, which is denoted {msg} priv T i , and broadcasts the following:
and checks that h(V * ) = V . If the equation holds, then C k uses G i to check that Cert i is correctly signed. If the vehicle C k has been revoked, the verifier can obtain the value R k from the CA and verify
* . The scheme aims to provide four security features. 1) Unlinkability. By changing K i and associated values at frequent intervals, the scheme prevents tracing of vehicles across the time intervals. 2) Authentication. A valid signature provides assurance that the message originated from a legitimate source. 3) Reliability. By using the tamper-resistant box BB k , it is guaranteed that each vehicle C k is only given one valid short-term public/private key pair pub T i /priv T i in every time interval and a maximum number m of such short-term key pairs in the lifetime of the secret s k . This key generation control provides assurance that multiple signatures on one event in the same interval must come from multiple vehicles. 4) Revocation. By having the CA as a revocation agency, an illegitimate vehicle C k can be revoked.
However, in the next section, we will show that none of these goals are achieved.
III. ATTACKS
We first show that the scheme does not achieve unlinkability. We note that, for any i ∈ {0, . . . , m − 1}
Hence, we have g
Since this is a value specific to BB k (and C k ), and the values g K i and H i are broadcast with every message, an eavesdropper will be able to link the activities of C k across all certificate updates.
We show next that any adversary who has observed one legitimate message can masquerade as a legitimate black box. Note that verification of the legitimacy of a message is done by computing 
The adversary may then generate a public/private key pair pub T i / priv T i , construct a valid Cert i usingK i , and send any message msg as
A receiver would calculate
and accepts the message as legitimate. Hence, the goal of authentication is not achieved. Note also that the aforementioned "forged" short-term private keỹ K i and its associated values are indistinguishable from an "authentic" key K i and its associated values. The adversary can create as many such keys as he wants in any time interval, and the total number of such "valid" keys is not restricted to the value m. As a result, there is no assurance that multiple signatures on one event in the same interval must be created by multiple vehicles. The functionality of the tamperresistant black box can be bypassed completely. The scheme, therefore, does not hold the property of message reliability.
Obviously, this adversary can survive under the revocation solution of the KWL scheme, since it is not under the CA's control. Any illegitimate source in the CA's revocation list can also escape from being revoked by performing the same trick as this adversary does.
IV. CONCLUSION
We have shown that the KWL scheme does not achieve the goals of authenticity of a message, privacy of drivers and vehicles, reliability of distributed information, and revocation of illegitimate vehicles.
